Defence Reforms, Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India

A roundtable discussion was held on 30 May 2011 to discuss the two papers on the subject written by Anit Mukherjee, Research Fellow IDSA;

a. Failing to Deliver: Post Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998-2010,
b. The Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India.

List of participants
General VP Malik (Retd), former Chief of Army Staff
Ajai Vikram Singh, former Defence Secretary
NS Sisodia, DG, IDSA
Air Marshal M Matheswaran, Air Headquarters
Air Marshal PK Mehra (Retd), Distinguished Fellow, CAPS
Vice Adm Pradeep Kaushiva (Retd), NMF
Maj Gen PS Sandhu (Retd), USI
Dr. Arvind Gupta, LBSC Chair, IDSA
Sqn Ldr PS Chhina (Retd), CAFHR, USI
Serving officers from the three service headquarters
Other members of IDSA.

His Excellency Shri NN Vohra, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir Presided.

The following important points in relation to Civil-Military Relations (CMR) got highlighted in the roundtable:

1. It was important to capture the weaknesses that accrue from the current problematic form of civil-military relations, observed one participant in the roundtable.

2. It was generally felt that debate on the CMR needs to move forward from the ‘bureaucracy versus the military’ towards one that encourages a respectful and well-informed dialogue between all the stakeholders in the system. Military education should instruct its officers to learn how the Government of India officials have to follow the rules of business. Moreover, the challenges and characteristics of Indian democracy and public-policy making and implementation should also be highlighted. In turn, there is a need to educate the civilian policy makers of the challenges and sacrifices made by the Indian military.

Our Comments:

1. It is a landmark decision of the IDSA to focus on the CMR and bring the issue in the public domain. Informed Citizens and Indian Think Tanks have an opportunity now to discuss the issue openly and dispassionately. Probably, lack of information & communication on the CMR; responsibilities and limitations of civil-military functioning within their charters; hardly any open debate(s) on the issue in setting of the Indian Democratic System involving all the stakeholders; our inability to see the CMR as an all inclusive issue, etc, are the issues that need to be addressed – the CMR are not limited to civil-military bureaucratic relations only as perceived by some.

2. We need regular monitoring of conduct of important ‘actors’ down up to District and Unit Levels who tend to derail the CMR . We can ill-afford to let the CMR be neglected any more; today's soldier is a vibrant part of the CMR in India.

Read the Proceedings: The Roundtable

Chairperson, SvipjaCMRChair.

Emerging Strategic Defence Culture in India, and Interplay of Civil - Military Relations

"Failing to Deliver Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998-2010", a Research Paper of Anit Mukherjee of the IDSA, laments lack of 'strategic culture' and inapt 'civil-military Ralations' as the main causes for the Reforms failing in a way.

This paper analyses civil-military relations in India from 1998 to 2010. It examines the reforms undertaken within national security agencies and their eventual outcome. In doing so it explores two major questions—what precipitated the reforms in India’s national security agencies after the 1999 Kargil war? And, what was the impact of these reforms and did they achieve their stated objectives?

It analyzes the Kargil Review Committee Report and its follow up, the Arun Singh Committee and describes some of the debates therein. While examining the implementation of defence reforms it then argues that despite some incremental progress they have failed the vision of their architects. This is primarily due to bureaucratic politics and the unique features of civil-military relations, which can be more accurately described as an “absent dialogue.” The penultimate section describes recent calls for re-visiting the defence reforms process but argues that without political will this is unlikely.

“bureaucratic inertia, political ineptitude and the state of civil-military relations .... may have more to do with the absence of strategic thinking”. Indeed, as this paper argues it is broadly these three factors that have obstructed defence reforms.

We, as a nation, let our inadequacies perpetuate incrementally for personal gains. This is the history of our sub-continent and its people unfortunately -- SvipjaCMRChair.

Read the Paper : http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_defencereform.pdf

SvipjaCMRChair

Forging India's Hard Power in the New Century

IDSA Issue Brief Forging India's Hard Power in the New Century is most relevant at this juncture. Such a research work could be of immense value to strategists. Could help shape our policies pragmatically based on scientific study.

The Researcher mentions various constituents of the Hard Power, one of it is ‘Civil-Military Relations’. It is a welcome thought. He postulates:

"Civil-Military Relations are at the core of any national security framework and the decision making process. While explicit political control over the military cannot be questioned, the need to involve the Indian armed forces as equal and responsible partners in the decision-making process is important.

Cross-pollination of national security bodies with defence expertise could contribute to better understanding on matters military and, consequently, the strategic thinking within the country.

In the short-to-medium term, it will entail the functional integration of the MoD and service headquarters, the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS), representation of military staff in national security structures such as the NSC, leveraging military diplomacy in pursuit of India’s foreign policy objectives, consistency in military resourcing and expenditure, procedural reforms in the acquisition process and defence industry, and ensuring adequate operational preparedness levels to meet a range of military challenges and non-traditional threats."

SvipjaCMRChair

No Magic Bullet for Anyone

On 23 April 1961, Lt Gen. P.N. Thapar, the then Chief of Army Staff designate, wrote two TOP SECRET letters to the outgoing chief, Gen. K.S. Thimayya, and Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen. S.P.P. Thorat, as revealed by Mr Anit Mukherjee, an IDSA Scholar, in his article 'No Magic Bullet for Military'.

These letters indicate two issues of contemporary relevance. The first is the widely acknowledged civil-military discord that preceded the disastrous 1962 war with China. The second, less well known, is the deep division that existed among senior military officers at that time.

It is known that recent dispute over the Sixth Pay Commission’s recommendations has left a bitter legacy between civilian principals in the defence ministry and the military. The civil officials claim, the manner in which the dispute was aired, created a dangerous precedence and undermined civilian control. On the other hand, the Military portrayed the episode as one where devious bureaucrats conspired to ensure that the services got a raw deal.

The present state of affairs ‘smack’ of unsatisfactory leadership, civil and military. And also 'coloured advocacy' by some. All this hurts CMR. We therefore have titled this Post 'No Magic Bullet for Anyone'. Our Research and Analysis ought to be honest and directed towards the norms of upholding our Constitution, and hold sane lessons for civil and military leadership, both.

We all must recall the NDA’s prayer to be followed by all stakeholders: calling for the strength to “do the harder right than the easier wrong”. In hindsight, despite our non-existent and somewhat faulty declassification policy, we are now aware about how civil-military tensions and a divided officer class contributed to the disaster of 1962. To prevent another disaster, it is time for all the stakeholders to engage in an honest and dispassionate critical examination.

Click No Magic Bullet for Military

SvipjaCMRChair

CMR in India: Changing Face of the Indian Soldier

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations was written by Samuel Huntington in the 1950s. In this book, Huntington referred to the role of a soldier vis-a-vis the State by drawing upon events and anecdotes that threw up challenges to a democracy whenever there was tension between the armed forces and the democratically elected leadership. Just as the Americans went through a critical phase of challenges thrown at the elected government by some military leaders, we too will have to learn to live with such episodes. It is often forgotten that India is a very young democracy and that both the government and the military would need to accommodate intrusions in each other’s limited space.

It is axiomatic that the soldier’s performance while practising the skills of management of violence is directly proportional to the support and aspirations of society. When military leaders are isolated from the decision-making structure of governance, the political leadership is bound to be isolated from the factors governing preparedness and morale of the forces. This in turn results in bureaucratic interpretations and increased isolation due to the trust deficit between the political leadership and the military. What are the symptoms of such isolation and what can be done to alleviate the situation?

There is evidence to show that the military is fast being identified with the police forces in the manner in which governments have tended to treat it.

By keeping the Service Chiefs out of the decision-making process, we have removed their accountability to the system, for, ipso facto, they are expected to deliver with what they have. What they should have is outside their prerogative. They follow the laws of Epictetus: “Do not be concerned with things that are beyond your power.”

Samuel Huntington also wrote about how society should treat a soldier.

CMR in India: Changing Face of the Indian Soldier

Maintain Civil-Military-Civil Maryada jealously.

SvipjaCMRChair
Author: Suresh Bangara, a former C-in-C of the Southern Naval Command.

Ethos of Military Leadership

The COAS is accountable for the functioning of the entire Army. It is a tradition that is ingrained in his psyche. All commissioned army officers study at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where, engraved at the entrance to Chetwode Hall - named after the then Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal PW Chetwode, who inaugurated the IMA on December 10, 1932, are the words,

"The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come second, always and every time. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time."

These words, from the speech Chetwode delivered while inaugurating the IMA 78 years ago, have inspired generations of officer-cadets who have passed out of the IMA.

Is it possible for civil leadership - political, bureaucratic, executive, etc - to walk through the Portals of the Chetwode Hall at the IMA, somehow, to imbibe the military ethos which may greatly help to preserve, protect and defend the Indian Constitution in line of their duties?

Chairperson, SvipjaCMRChair
This Posting is inspired by The Economic Times, 03 Jan 2011 .

'The Last Post'

We have all heard the Armed Forces Buglers rendering 'The Last Post'. It's the song that gives us the lump in our throats and usually tears in our eyes. Here is the story behind it.

Reportedly, it all began in 1862 during the American Civil War, when Union Army Captain Robert Ellicombe was with his men near Harrison's Landing in Virginia. The Confederate Army was on the other side of the narrow strip of land.

During the night, Captain Ellicombe heard the moans of a soldier who lay severely wounded on the field. Not knowing if it was a Union or Confederate soldier, the Captain decided to risk his life and bring the stricken man back for medical attention. Crawling on his stomach through the gunfire, the Captain reached the stricken soldier and began pulling him toward his encampment.

When the Captain finally reached his own lines, he discovered it was actually a Confederate soldier, but the soldier was dead.

The Captain lit a lantern and suddenly caught his breath and went numb with shock. In the dim light, he saw the face of the soldier. It was his own son. The boy had been studying music in the South when the war broke out. Without telling his father, the boy enlisted in the Confederate Army.

The following morning, heartbroken, the father asked permission of his superiors to give his son a full military burial, despite his enemy status.

The Captain had asked if he could have a group of Army band members play a funeral dirge for his son at the funeral. The request was turned down since the soldier was a Confederate. But, out of respect for the father, they gave him only one musician. The Captain chose a bugler. He asked the bugler to play a series of musical notes he had found on a piece of paper in the pocket of the dead youth's uniform.

The haunting melody, we now know as 'The Last Post' used at military funerals was born.

The words are:-

Day is done.
Gone the sun.
From the lakes
From the hills.
From the sky.
All is well.
Safely rest.
God is nigh.
-------
Fading light.
Dims the sight.
And a star.
Gems the sky.
Gleaming bright.
From afar.
Drawing nigh.
Falls the night.
-------
Thanks and praise.
For our days.
Neath the sun
Neath the stars.
Neath the sky .
As we go.
This we know.
God is nigh.

Courtesy: Mr GS Sahni, ex-Secretary, IAS(SSNT20.

PS: Remember those lost and harmed while serving their country. Also remember those who have served and returned; and those presently serving in the Armed Forces.

Proactive Role of all the Stakeholders in CMR

CMR are dynamic and must remain so in a vibrant democracy like India. ‘Its Operation’ is to be articulated wisely and honestly. CMR in a democracy is a product of two different set of minds and ethos,civil and military,with a common objective - well-being of the nation.

Politicians should play an active role in routine management of civil and military bureaucracies. Both the streams are well-endowed with ‘field’ and ‘desk’ experiences with reasonably sound ‘sense’, and ‘task-orientation’. They tend to create aberrations and vitiate working environments only when over-jealous in protecting their turfs. One can’t work effectively without the other, their roles are fairly complementary.

In a democracy, it is the onerous task of 'higher leadership' to retain the right balance in the CMR. Needs all round training and maturity of purpose in governance system to effect the ‘right CMR’ at all levels. Govts and Defence Services the world over learn CMR in the backdrop of environments prevailing in their country regularly, may be sometimes at a heavy cost.

Ministers, National-Level Politicians, Bureaucrats and Other stakeholders should remain proactive and be on the field routinely to build ‘right CMR’. Relevant protocols be honoured. It is important to be with each other on ‘right’ occasions.

We need special efforts in India to build effective CMR where civil and military both continue to be in the ‘Raj Hangover’, quoting still from the past practices without realizing that we all are part of Independent India now and have equal stakes in the well-being of our nation, India.

Do not deliberately pull down each other. Maintain Civil-Military-Civil Maryada.

Chairperson,SvipjaCMRChair